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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELIZABETH VICTORIA COOK,
Defendant and Appellant,
Case No. 20150847-CA

v.

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
UT.AH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT. R. APP. P. 3 provide this Court with
jurisdiction over this appeal from the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, dated October 6,
2015, (the "Judgment") by the Honorable Keith C. Barnes of the Fifth District Court, in
and for Iron County, State of Utah.

A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto as

Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, PRESERVATION,
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court proper!J find and conclude that Cook exhibited actual
physical control of the four-wheeler while riding as a passenger and while
intoxicated to support a conviction far DUI?

PRESERVATION: Cook's defense at trial was that her 10-year-old daughter was
the one driving the four-wheeler and that she had not exhibited any control over such
vehicle while riding on it as a passenger. R0123-1048. The court found that Cook had
control in three (3) ways: (1) by maneuvering the handlebars (from the officer's brief

observation as the vehicle was coming to a stop); (2) by giving commands to her daughter as
to how to drive it; and (3) by helping her daughter turn the vehicle by placing her hands on
her daughter's shoulders to guide her how to steer it.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)):
"Ultimate factual determinations such as this are limited by legal principles that guide a trial
court in its fact finding function." State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah App. 1993); see
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1268-1272 (Utah 1993). ''These legal guidelines create a
field of inquiry within which the trial court can make its ultimate factual findings." Id., citing
State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 521-22 (Utah App. 1992)(Bench, P.J., concurring). ''Whether
or not a trial court operated within the proper field of inquiry is a determination we make
using a correction-of-error standard of review." Id., see Thurman at 1271-1272; Richardson at
522 (Bench, P.J., concurring). ''We do not, however, apply the correction-of-error standard
to every aspect of a trial court's finding of ultimate fact." Id. at 476. ''The correction-oferror standard is intended to allow us to review and correct the trial court's determination of
'the legal content' of an ultimate finding." Id., citing Thurman at 1271-1272. ''We defer, on
the other hand, to the trial court's findings of underlying facts." Id., citing Thurman at 12711272. "Consequently, we defer to a trial court's judgment of a debatable issue made within
the trial court's proper realm of factual inquiry, such as a finding based on the totality of the
circumstances." Id. "Absent a violation of legal guidelines, a trial court's finding of ultimate
fact remains on the same level as any other underlying factual finding, and we defer." Id. see
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780 (defer to trial court's finding of actual physical
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control unless trial court misapplied the law or the finding was clearly against the weight of
the evidence); Gania v. Schewendiman, 645 P.2d 651,653 (Utah 1982) (same).

ISSUE II:

Did the trial court err in finding that the officer had proper!J conducted the
Baker test given that no information as to synchronization of dijfering
timing devices was presented to ensure the mandated 15 minute time frame
had been undertaken?

PRESERVATION: Cook objected during the trial on a foundation basis when the
officer was unable to verify the synchronization of the two (2) different timing devices
utilized in administering the Baker test on Cook. R108.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)): A trial
court's detennination as to admissibility based on foundation or lack thereof will not be
overturned "unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion." State v. Re!Jea, 2012 UT
.App ,i 16, 288 P.3d 278, dting Vialpando at ,i 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).

ISSUE III:

Was Cook's trial counsel ineffective for failing to follow-through on the
suppression motion filed with regard to unreasonable detainment for
investigative purposes?

PRESERVATION: "We have previously stated that two conditions should be met
before we will treat the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
In State v. Humphries, we stated that 'ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on
appeal if [1] the trial record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and [2] defendant is
represented by counsel other than trial counsel." State v. Utherland, 2000 UT App 76, ,I 9, 12
P.3d 92 dting Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d
37, 40 (Utah 1996).

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P. 9(c)(7)(B)): 'With
respect to any ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's
3

performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment ... Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient
performance was prejudicial - i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland at iJ
19, dting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 -88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984) (additional citations omitted).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI states the following:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
B. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-502 (1) states the following:
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within
this state if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical
test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration
of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable
of safely operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of operation or actual physical control.
C. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-22-2(1 l)(b) states that a "motor vehicle" includes an

off-highway vehicle.

D. UTAH CODE .ANN. §41-22-2(15) states that "operator" means a person who is
in actual physical control of an off-highway vehicle.
E. UT. R. CRIM. P. 12(d) states that a motion to suppress evidence shall:
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed;
4

(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and
(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them.
F. UT R. EVID. 104(b): Relevance that depends on a fact. When the relevance of
evidence depends on whether a fact exits, proof must be introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit the
proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.
G. UT. R. EVID. 401: Test for Relevant Evidence. Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
H. UT. R. EVID. 403: Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion,

Waste of Time, or Other Reasons. The court may exclude relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

STATEMENT OF CASE
On January 3, 2015, Iron County Sheriff Deputy .A. Burton ("Burton") cited and
summoned Cook with a DUI Summons and Citation for the offenses of Driving Under the
Influence of . Alcohol and/ or Drugs with Passengers Under Sixteen Years of Age, a class A
misdemeanor; and Open Container in a Vehicle, a class C misdemeanor. ROOS. On January
9, 2015, the State filed an Information charging Cook with Driving Under the Influence of
.Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a class A Misdemeanor; and Open Container in a Vehicle a class C
Misdemeanor. R007-8.
On January 20, 2015, Cook was before the trial court for an initial appearance. R015.
Cook waived the reading of the Information. Id. Cook indicated that she planned to hire
private counsel and did not want to enter a plea. Id. The trial court entered non-guilty pleas
5

onto the record so that the case would proceed through the system. Id. On March 25, 2015,
Cook's Affidavit of Indigenry was filed with the trial court. R025. The trial court found Cook
to be indigent and appointed Jack Burns ("Bums") to represent her. R0030.
On March 31, 2015, a status conference was held. R042. During the hearing, Burns
requested that the jury trial scheduled for April 8, 2015, be continued because he had just
been appointed to represent Cook. Id. The State did not object to the continuance. Id. The
trial court granted Bum's motion to continue the jury trial. Id.
On July 15, 2015, Cook was before the trial court for a preliminary hearing. After the
presentation of evidence and testimony, the trial court found that there was sufficient
evidence to proceed towards trial. R054. Cook was bound-over on Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class A misdemeanor. Id.

The trial court dismissed

the Open Container charge. Id. Cook waived the reading of the Information and entered a
not-guilty plea. Id.
On July 16, 2015, Burns filed a Motion to Suppress (the "Motion''). R060. The Motion
requested the trial court suppress any and all evidence obtained via a police search of the
personal property of Cook, all statements that Cook made to police and/ or other state
agents, and results of tests conducted on any alleged evidence seized from Cook. Id. The
Motion indicated that Cook had standing to move for the suppression of the abovereferenced items/evidence because the search was conducted on her person. Id. The Motion
stated that Cook had been seized and transported to the Iron County Jail (the "Jail'')
without probable cause. Id. The Motion requested that evidence obtained subsequent to the
seizure be suppressed. Id.

6

Cook's bench trial occurred on September 17, 2015. R066-7. After the trial court
received witness testimony and evidence, Cook was found guilty of the offense of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a class A misdemeanor. Id.
On October 6, 2015, Cook was sentenced and the Judgment was entered. R069. The
Judgment indicated that Cook was sentenced to serve a term of three hundred sixty-four
(364) days in the Iron County Jail for the offense of Driving Under the Influence of
.Alcohol/Drugs, a class A misdemeanor. R070. The trial court suspended three hundred
sixty-two (362) days of the imposed sentence. Id.

Cook was ordered to pay a fine in the

amount of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1500), with a fifty dollar ($50) payment
being made on the first of each month beginning on December 1, 2015. Id.
.Also on October 6, 2015, the Judgment, Sentence and Probation Order (the
"Probation Order") was entered. R072. The Probation Order indicated that Cook was

placed on probation for a period of twenty-four (24) months with probation to be
supervised through Private Probation.

Id.

Cook was ordered to sign-up for Private

Probation within forty-eight (48) hours. Id. She was ordered to serve two (2) days in Jail
beginning on October 9, 2015. Id. Cook was ordered to pay a one thousand five hundred
dollar ($1500) dollar fine, including a 90% surcharge and a court security fee in the amount
of forty-three dollars ($43). Id. She was ordered to reimburse Iron County for her courtappointed attorney in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100) and ordered to obey all laws
and commit no further violations of law. Id.

Cook was ordered to obtain an alcohol/ drug

assessment evaluation, which was to be filed with the trial court on or before December 1,
2015. R072. She was also ordered to not possess or consume alcoholic beverages, sign a
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consent-to-release treatment form to be accessed by authorized individuals, submit to
warrantless searches of her person and/ or property, submit a DNA sample and pay the
required fee, and keep the trial court informed of any change in address. Id.
Counsel herein entered his Notice ofAppearance-Appellate Matter on October 13, 2015.
R076. On October 13, 2015, the jail sent a letter to the trial court. R078. The letter
indicated that Cook failed to appear for her two (2) day commitment as was so ordered in
the Probation Order. Id.

An Amended Commitment Order was filed with the trial court on

October 15, 2015, commanding the Iron County Sheriff to take Cook and deliver her to the

Jail

on October 16, 2015, to serve her two (2) day commitment. ROSS.

Offender

Management Solutions ("OMS"), a private probation provider company, emailed an

Activation Report to the trial court on October 16, 2015, which indicated that Cook entered
into an agreement with OMS for her probation supervision. R089.
On October 22, 2015, Southwest Behavioral Health Center counselor Rylee Munn,
submitted a letter to the trial court which indicated that Cook participated in a Drug and
Alcohol Evaluation at the Horizon House on October 20, 2015. R091. The letter stated that,
''based on the results of the Evaluation, [Cook] appeared to score in a fashion similar to
someone who [was] chemically dependent." Id

Munn recommended that Cook attend and

complete day treatment at the Horizon House. Id
On December 3, 2015, Southwest Behavioral Health Center filed a letter with the trial
court. R174. The letter stated that, on November 11, 2015, Cook entered into residential
treatment at the Horizon House.

Id Cook's treatment was estimated to last for

approximately ninety (90) days. Id

8

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Bench Trial - September 17, 2015
On September 17, 2015, the matter came for a bench trial. R095. The State passed
on giving an opening statement. Id. Burns reserved the giving of his opening statement.
R096. Burns pointed out that an error had occurred on the court calendar. Id. Burns stated
that the court calendar showed two (2) pending charges for Cook; however, count two (2)
had been dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Id. The State understood as well that count
two (2) had been dismissed. Id. The trial proceeded only on count one (1). Id. The State
presented their case by calling their first witness. Id.
1. Direct-Examination of Burton

Burton was a fully certified Category I Peace Officer employed with the Iron County
Sheriff's Office for the past nine (9) years as a patrol supervisor and canine handler. R097.
Burton was POST certified in field-sobriety tests and Intoxilyzer certification. Id. He was
also ARIDE certified, meaning ..Advanced Roadside Impairment Enforcement. Id. Burton
estimated that he had been involved in approximately seventy-five (JS) to one hundred (100)
DUI investigations Id.
On January 3, 2015, Burton was responding to another matter when he allegedly
observed Cook on a four-wheeler coming towards him at a high rate of speed. R098.
Burton stopped his vehicle and the four-wheeler slid to a stop. Id. The roads were covered
with snow.

Id.

Burton made contact with the four-wheeler which consisted of three

passengers to wit: J.C. in the front, Cook in the middle and James Himmel ("Himmel") on
the back. Id. When asked if he noticed or saw who had been steering the four-wheeler,
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Burton testified that "Elizabeth Cook had her hand on the handlebars when I made initial
contact ... " R099. Cook was also holding a beer can. Id. Burton allegedly never observed

J.C. operating the four-wheeler.

R101. Burton identified that Himmel was only eighteen

(18) years old. Id. Himmel admitted to Burton that he had a cap of hard alcohol at his
mother's home. Id.

Burton could smell an odor of alcohol on Cook, she was belligerent,

had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. Id. and R102. Cook admitted to Burton that she had
drank a little bit that day and that it had been her daughter, J.C., who was driving the fourwheeler not her. Id. Burton located the beer can he observed Cook holding on the ground
near her feet. Id. Burton also found a second beer can in the pocket of Cook's coat. Id.
Burton cited Himmel for under-age consumption and transported Cook to Jail. Id.
While at the Jail, Burton conducted the Standardized Field-Sobriety Tests ("FSTs")
on Cook. R103. Burton explained that FSTs are standardized tests that show the level of
alcohol and/ or impairment that may be on a person or in their blood. Id. FSTs consisted of
horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-tum, and the one-legged stand. Id. The first FST
Burton had Cook perform was the horizontal gaze nystagmus. R104. He observed six (6)
out of six (6) clues. Id.

Secondly, Burton had Cook perform the walk-and-tum. Id. He

observed six (6) out of eight (8) clues. R105. Lastly, Burton performed the one-legged stand
on Cook. Id. He observed three (3) out of six (6) clues. Id. No portable breath test was
conducted upon Cook. R106. Burton gave Cook a breath-alcohol concentration ("BAC'')
test using the Intoxilyzer ("Intoxilyzer") Machine 8000. Id. Burton had previously received
training on how to operate the Intxoilyzer. Id. The Intoxilyzer had been calibrated before
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and after Cook's BAC. Id. Burton identified State's Exhibit I as the calibration certificates
for the Intoxilyzer. Id.
Burton observed Baker on Cook.
"mouth alcohol." Id.

R107.

Burton explained that Baker tested for

In order to observe Baker, you have the person open their mouth and

lift up their tongue. Id. and R108. The purpose of Baker is to ensure that nothing was in the
person's mouth and that no regurgitation or belching occurred prior to BAC testing. Id.
After observing Baker, Burton received consent from Cook to conduct the BAC. Id.
Burns raised an objection on the basis of foundation arguing that not all of the Baker
element requirements had been met through the State's line of questioning. Id. Burns also
argued in his objection that no questions had been asked whether Burton was certified to use
the lntoxilyzer. Id. Burns objection was sustained. Id.
Burton was certified to use the Intoxilyzer. Id

Burton observed Baker at 14:34.

R 109. Baker is observed for fifteen (15) minutes. Id. Burton did not observe Cook to have
any regurgitation, belching nor eat or drink anything during the fifteen (15) minute period of
observation. Id Burton observed Baker at 14:34 and gave the BAC test at 14:51. Rl 10. Mr.
Burns requested and was allowed to ask Burton a few questions on voir dire towards
foundation. Id.

2. Voir Dire Examination of Burton
Burton verified that he recorded the time of 14:34. Id Burton "probably used his
cell phone" to note the time of Baker but could not recall if that is what he had done.
Burton stated that he nonnally used his cell phone to note the time. R111.

Burton

administered the B.AC test on Cook at 14:51 and he pulled that time off of the Intoxilyzer
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receipt. Id. Burton did not enter the time of 14:51 into the Intoxilyzer; the Intoxilyzer
entered the time. Id.
Burns objected to the admission of the BAC results because two (2) separate time
pieces were used and no testimony was offered as to whether the two (2) separate times
pieces were synchronized.

R112.

Burns also objected that no testimony was offered

regarding the specific amount of time that elapsed between the time recorded and the time
of Baker. Id. Burns argued that Baker is a foundational issue in order for evidence to be
admissible. Id. Burns argued that the fifteen (15) minute time requirement on Baker is a strict
compliance admissibility issue and that it is part of the foundational requirement in order for
the B..AC test results to be offered as evidence. R113.
The State argued that Burns should have brought up this issue as to the admissibility
of the BAC being submitted as evidence prior to trial Id. The trial court indicated that a
Motion was filed by Burns on July 16, 2015; however the Motion was vague and did not
provide details of what it contained. Id.

Burns stated "obviously he had not followed

through with the Motion." Rl 14.
Burns indicated that during suppression hearing, he would address any issues there
may be with Baker.

Id. The trial court asked for a case to guide them on the factual

determination on whether or not the fifteen (15) minutes as set forth under the Baker
standard was actually met and whether Baker was a weight or admissibility issue. Id.

Burns

indicated that State v. Ramirez is Utah's Baker case. Id. The trial court indicated that the
remainder of the evidence would be heard first and the Burns would brief the Ramirez case.
Id.
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The trial court allowed Burton to finish answering the questions because evidence
was offered to show that the fifteen (15) minute requirement had been met, because of two
(2) electronic devices that gave a two (2) minute cushion. R115. The court indicated that
seventeen (17) minutes on competing devices did meet the fifteen (15) minute Baker
requirement. R116. The trial court allowed Burns to continue with his voir dire questioning.

Id. Burton did not use his cell phone to time the fifteen (15) minutes when he observed
Baker. Id. Burton explained that the officer physically entered the time from his cell phone
in the Intoxilyzer. Id. The Intoxilyzer then counted down the fifteen (15) minutes from the
time that was manually entered in. Id. As soon as the Baker test was finished, the Intoxilyzer
went through air blank and the diagnostic testing, which resulted in the gap of time. Rl 17.
Burton explained that the results did not show that he gave the BAC test at 14:51 and that

Baker was also observed at 14:51. Id. To clarify what he meant, Burton stated that "I typed
it in and then observed Baker for fifteen (15) minutes on the machine, so the machine did
the fifteen (15) minute timing thing." Id.
requested certain information such as:

Burton further explained that the Intoxilyzer

driver license number; name; officer name; case

number; and time observed, where he types in the time manually. Id. After the information
was manually entered, the officer would "press start" to begin the Baker fifteen (15) minute
countdown. Id.

.

Burton assumed that the Intoxilyzer had its own time set, but did not

know for sure. R118. Burton stated that he was unsure where the Intoxilyzer pulled its time
from because the Intoxilyzer was not plugged into an outside source such as the internet or a
telephone line. Id.

3. Continuation of Direct-Examination of Burton
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Burton gave the BAC to Cook; which indicated a BAC of 0.119 grams. Rl 19. Burton
told Cook the results of her BAC, placed her into a holding cell and filled out a probable
cause statement to support her being booked into jail. R120.

4. Cross-Examination of Burton
Burton separated J.C., Cook and Himmel to speak with them individually. Id. When
Burton questioned Cook, there was an issue as to whether she was the one operating the
four-wheeler. Id.

Burton did not talk with J.C. or Himmel as to who had been operating

the four-wheeler. R121. At the conclusion of Burns direct examination of Burton, the State
rested. Id. Burns called Cook as the first witness for the defense. Id.

5. Direct-Examination of Cook
On January 3, 2015, Cook was at a cabin that belonged to family friends.

R123.

Also on that date, Cook and J.C. were on a four-wheeler; with J.C. sitting in front driving the
four-wheeler. Id.

Cook did not operate the four-wheeler. R124.

Cook put her hands on

the handlebars when they stopped quickly as a way to protect J.C. Id. Cook did not operate
the accelerator, the brakes, and the clutch nor steer the four-wheeler.

Id. Cook was a

passenger while J.C. operated the four-wheeler. Id.

6. Cross-Examination of Cook
Cook was at the cabin on a family outing. R128. It was not snowing. Id. It had
snowed days prior. R129. It was a sunny day, however Cook and J.C. both were wearing
coats and gloves. Id. Cook did not know brands and sizes of four-wheelers, but the fourwheeler they had been on was big enough for three people. Id.

Cook and her family had

been to the cabin owned by the Himmels several times prior to the date in question. R130.
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Cook had operated the four-wheeler before. Id. At the time of this family outing, J.C. was
ten (10) years old. Id.

J.C. had also been on the four-wheeler before and had received

training on how to operate four-wheelers. Id. When the four-wheeler slid to a stop, Cook
was concerned for J.C.'s safety so she reached forward and placed her hands in the middle of
the handlebars in front of J.C. as a way to protect her. R131. The only time Cook had her
hands on the handlebars was when she was protecting J.C. R132. Cook never operated the
four-wheeler. Id. Cook and her husband gave J.C. training on how to properly stop and
operate four-wheeler, as well as how many riders can safely be on the four-wheeler at one
time. R133.

7. Direct-Examination of J.C.
J.C. was operating the four-wheeler when they were stopped by the officer. R136.
J.C. was in the front, Cook in the middle and Himmel on the back of the four-wheeler.
R137. When J.C. first got onto the four-wheeler, she was sitting in the middle so that
Himmel could start it Id. and R138. Once the four-wheeler was started, J.C. moved into the
front position and drove. R138. J.C. stated that Cook protected her from almost crashing
but otherwise just directed by saying 'turn this way' and held J.C.'s shoulders. Id. J.C. was
using the accelerator. Id. J.C. does not recall Cook ever operating the four-wheeler. Id.

8. Cross-Examination of J.C.
Himmel taught J.C. how to ride the four-wheeler. R140. J.C. had only ridden on a
four-wheeler a few times prior to January 3, 2015. Id.

The four-wheeler was large enough

for three (3) people. Id. Cook told J.C. which way to turn and how to stop the four-wheeler.
R141. The only time J.C. felt scared while driving the four-wheeler was when she almost
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swerved off the road to stop for the Officer. Id. J.C. felt in control of the four-wheeler.
R142. Cook held J.C.'s shoulders and told her to "be careful." Id. J.C. does not recall Cook
ever placing her hands on the handlebars of the four-wheeler. R143. Cook only placed her
hands on J.C. shoulders and said: "hurry up and push the brakes or we're going to crash."

Id.
9. Direct-Examination of Himmel
Himmel knew Cook. R145. Himmel recalled interacting with the officer on January
3, 2015. R146. Himmel was on the back of the four-wheeler. R147. Himmel helped to
stop the four-wheeler by placing his foot on the foot brake. Id.

Himmel's position was

passenger. R148. Himmel never observed Cook operating the four-wheeler. Id.
At the conclusion of Himmel's testimony, Burns rested. Id.

The State called Burton

as a rebuttal witness. Id.

10. Direct-Examination of Rebuttal Witness Burton
Burton had previous interaction with four-wheelers. R149. He recognized that Cook
was on an Arctic Cat 500, which was a large four-wheeler. Id.

11. Closing Arguments
At the conclusion of testimony and evidence, the trial court heard arguments from
the State and Burns. R150. The State argued that they had met the burden of proving the
elements for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs with a Minor. Id. The
State believed it had shown through evidence and testimony that Cook was in control and
operating the four-wheeler. Id. The State argued against the defense theory that J.C. was
operating the four-wheeler simply because J.C. could not start the four-wheeler on her own.
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Id. Burton observed Cook with her hands on the handlebars. Id.

Cook's BAC results

indicated that she was above the legal limit and that J.C. was on the four-wheeler with her.
R151. The State requested that the trial count convict Cook of Driving Under the Influence
of .Alcohol and/ or Drugs with a Minor. Id.
Burns argued that a passenger on a vehicle could not constitute actual physical
control over that vehicle. R152. Burns argued that all the evidence before the trial court
proved that J.C. was operating the four-wheeler, not Cook. R153. Burns argued that the
State had not met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Burns requested the trial court
acquit Cook on the charge of Driving Under the Influence of .Alcohol and/ or Drugs with a
Minor. Id.
During rebuttal, the State further argued that it was not possible for a nine (9) year
old girl of J.C.'s size and physicality to have been in control of the four-wheeler. Id. The
four-wheeler was an .Arctic Cat, which is a large four-wheeler. R154.

Cook was operating

and in control of the four-wheeler. R155.
The trial court did not believe J.C. was big enough "to do everything she [needed] to
do on an .Arctic Cat 500." R157. The trial court did not "[believe] that J.C. could shift,
reach the breaks and run the accelerator because her body [was] not big enough." Id. The
trial court could not see that a mother would put their nine (9) year old child on a fourwheeler and say "drive." Id. The trial court stated that in a crisis the adult would take control
over the vehicle so that they did not wreck and no harm came upon themselves or their
children. R158. The court believed that, by Cook's own admission as to her actions taken
to protect J.C., that she admitted she had control of the vehicle. Id. The trial court found
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three (3) different ways that Cook had "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler. Id.
First, Cook was driving. Id.

Cook maneuvered the handlebars. Id. Secondly, Cook gave

commands to a person in control. Id. The trial court stated that accomplice liability statute
implied that "if you are participating then you are doing it." Id.

Third, J.C. testified that

Cook took control the four-wheeler to get it started. R159. The trial court found Cook
guilty of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol/ or Drugs. Id.

Burns

requested that Cook be sentenced according to the timeframe permitted by the statute. Id.
Sentencing was scheduled for October 6, 2015. Id.

Burns expressed to the trial court that

he no longer wanted to brief the issue about the Intoxilyzer and the standard of Baker
because Burton testified under Voit Dire to the workings of the Intoxilyzer. R160.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed error in failing to properly conclude that Cook exhibited
"actual physical control" over the four-wheeler. The "totality of the circumstances" were
not met to support Cook's conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or
Drugs. Testimony was offered through Cook's daughter J.C., who stated that she had been
operating the four-wheeler, and Himmel testified that he used the foot brake in order to help
the four-wheeler stop. Himmel had exercised actual physical control of the vehicle, but Cook
had not. The four-wheeler had to stop suddenly once Burton was spotted. Given that the
roads were snow packed and the four-wheeler started sliding, Cook felt concerned for the
safety of J.C. and raised her hands in front of J.C. in order to protect her from harm; with
her hands landing on the middle of the handlebars. What was observed by the officer was
that "Elizabeth Cook had her hand on the handlebars when I made initial contact ... " R099.
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No further testimony was offered by the State that Cook had exhibited any other actions
required to be in "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler. Cook was convicted of the
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class A misdemeanor.
In order for Cook's BAC test results to be admissible as relevant evidence, the
standard three (3) steps Baker requirement needed to be met. The State presented evidence
to suggest that the first two steps of Baker had been met. Specifically, the State introduced
evidence that the Intoxilyzer had been calibrated and that Burton had received training on
how to properly work the Intoxilyzer and administer a BAC; however, the third requirement
of Baker was not met. The third requirement was that Baker was observed for the fifteen
(15) minute time period.

The evidence introduced by the State as to the fifteen (15)

observation period was that Burton used his cell phone to note the time of Baker in the
Intoxilyzer machine, and the Intoxilyzer machine counted 15 minutes from that time taken
from a different device, then the print-out sheet noted the time from the Intoxilyzer
machine that the BAC was administered. The State neglected to introduce any evidence that
would show that the two differing timing devices were synchronized.

The trial court

committed error in determining that the Baker fifteen (15) minute observation period had
been sufficiently met in order for Cook's BAC to be admissible.
A suppression hearing was "critical' to Cook. Burns rendered "ineffective assistance

of counsel" for failure to follow-through with the Motion that he filed on behalf of Cook.
Burns Motion correctly laid out the evidence that needed to be suppressed; however, he
neglected to articulate legal and factual authority to support what he was seeking be
suppressed. Burns was also "ineffective" for failure to have a suppression hearing. The
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Motion to Suppress was crucial to Cook because it addressed issues with Baker and the
admittance of her BAC. Burns ineffectiveness impacted Cook and the outcome of her case.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO
PROPERLY FIND AND CONCLUDE THAT COOK EXHIBITED
ACTUAL
CONTROL
OF
THE
FOUR-WHEELER
WHILE
INTOXICATED TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR A DUI.
According to UTAH CODE ANN. 41-22-2(1 l)(b) an off-highway vehicle is considered a

motor vehicle. "Operator" has been defined as a "person who is in actual physical control of
an off-highway vehicle.'' UTAH CODE ANN. 41-22-2(15). "[A]ctual physical control' in its
ordinary sense means 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination
or regulation." State v. Vialpando, 2004 UT App 95, ,I 21, 89 P.3d 209 (citations omitted).
Concerning the scope of "actual physical control," this Court concluded that "the
determination must be made through examining the 'totality of the circumstances."' Id. at 1
22, dting State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404,483 P.2d 442,478 (1971).

In a jurisdiction where the negligence of a driver can be imputed to the passenger if
the driver and passenger are found to be in an agent/ principal relationship, the court
undertook an analysis as to whether a passenger giving directions to the driver and the driver
following such direction creates an agency relationship. Benson v. Sorrell, 627 N.E.2d 866 (Ind.
App. 1994). The Benson court analyzed a case that had found the passenger "had the right to
give her husband directions and, to be sure, could well have had a duty to warn if and only if
she knew of an impending danger and the husband-driver was unaware of its presence." Id.
at 868, tiling Leuck v. Goe~ 151 Ind.App. 528, 280 N.E.2d 847, 855 (1972). In another case,
the Benson court noted that control could not be imputed to a passenger where no evidence

20

showed they "had any control over the speed at which the automobile was traveling, the
yielding or failure to yield the right of way at intersections, or any other of the elements
which contributed to the manner in which the automobile proceeded along the route
selected." Id., dting Shannon v. Hollingsworth, 291 Ala. 159, 163, 279 So.2d 428, 432 (1973). The

Benson court further cited a case indicating that "the circumstances must be such that the
occupant and the driver together had such control and direction over the automobile as to
be practically in the joint or common possession of it." Id., dting Bryant v. Padftc Electric RR

Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 P. 385 (1917). The Benson court agreed with these cases and concluded
that, "[m]erely giving a driver directions does not amount to control over the vehicle equal
to that the driver exercises." Id. at 869. The control was instead the manner in which the
operator themselves choose to drive the vehicle, regardless of any directions given, which
the Benson court found appropriate since otherwise intoxicated individuals taking a taxi cab
and providing directions would still implicate them for DUI. Id. at 868-869, dting Churchill v.

Briggs, 225 Iowa 1187, 1190, 282 N.W. 280,282 (1938)(quoting Cram v. City of Des Moines, 185
Iowa 1292, 172 N.W. 23 (1919)); see also 8 ..Am.Jur.2d Automobiles§ 706(" ... the mere giving
of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the
vehicle.").
In State v. Sanche~ the Kansas appeal court recently undertook an analysis indicating
taht an intoxicated passenger can exert actual physical control over a vehicle by grabbing the
steering wheel while in the passenger seat and altering the vehicle's movement. Ibid., 48
Kan.App.2d 608, 296 P.3d 1133 (2013); see also 94 A.LR.6 th 671 (2014). The recitation of
cases in Sanchez all indicate that, "a passenger can exert actual physical control over a vehicle

21

by grabbing the steering wheel or by doing other things that cause the vehicle to move." Id.
at 611-612, citing State v. Rivera, 207 Ariz. 69, 74, 83 P.3d 69 (2004)("[W]e conclude that, a
passenger who grabs the steering wheel of a moving car and alters the car's movement has
assumed actual physical control for purposes of the DUI statutes."); In re P.H., 192
Ca.App.4th 1465, 1472, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 43 (201 l)("The defendant ... grabbed the wheel and
caused the vehicle to change direction and crash. By that act she made herself the driver as
she exercised actual physical control over the vehicle."); People v. Yamat, 475 Mich. 49, 5758,
714 N.W.2d 335 (2006)("[D]efendnat's act of grabbing the steering wheel and thereby
causing the car to veer off the road clearly constitutes 'actual physical control of a motor
vehicle."');

People

v.

Crombleholme,

8

A.D.3d

1068,

1070,

778

N.Y.S.2d

256

(2004)("Defendant's action in grabbing the steering wheel [as passenger[ and controlling the
direction of the vehicle fall within the definition of operation of a motor vehicle."); City of

Valley City v. Be~ 394 N.W.2d 690, 691 (N.D. 1986)(holding passenger exercised "actual
physical control" by staritng the vehicle, after which it lurched forward and struck another
vehicle); State v. Wallace, 166 Ohio App.3d 845, 849, 853 N.E.2d 704 (2006)(''Wallace's
conduct [as passenger] caused movement of the vehicle and the driver's loss of control when
she grabbed the steering wheel and caused the vehicle to crash."); Moe v. MVD, 133 Or.App.
75, 79, 889 P.2d 1334 (1995)(holding passenger was a "driver" by turning on the ignition and
inadvertently putting the car into gear, causing it to move); Com. Dept. ofTransp. v. Hoover, 161
Pa.Cmwlth. 517, 522, 637 A.2d 721 (1994)("When a passenger in a vehicle chooses to
engage in such foolish conduct as grabbing the steering wheel ... that person is assuming
actual physical control.''); Dugger v. Com., 40 Va.App. 586, 594, 580 S.E.2d 477 (2003)("By
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forcibly taking the steering over from the driver, appellant manipulated perhaps the most
fundamental feature of a moving vehicle-the direction in which it would travel. That
deliberate act placed him in actual physical control of the vehicle."); In re Arambu4 37
Wash.App. 805, 808, 683 P.2d 1123 (1984)("[M]omentary grabbing of the steering wheel of a
vehicle [by the passenger] comes within the ordinary meaning of the term 'actual physical
control."'). The Sanchez court concluded "that a passenger becomes the driver or operator
when he or she grabs the steering wheel and alters the vehicle's movement." Id. at 613.
\Vhen an ultimate finding of fact is made in violation of a legal guideline, we correct it
under a correction-of-error standard of review. State

l'.

F.nchell, 850 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah .App

1993)dting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993) (using corrcction-ofcrror standard allows appellate court to consider "legal content" of ultimate factual findings).
These legal guidelines create a field of inquiry within which the trial court can make its
ultimate factual findings.

State v. Barnhart,. 850 P.2d 473 (Utah App 1993); titing State v.

Richardson, 843 P .2d 517, 521-22 (Utah App.1992} (Bench, P .J ., concurring). Whether or not
a trial court operated within the proper field of inquiry is a determination we make using a
correction-of-error standard of review. See_. Th11rman at Thurman, 846 P.2d at 12711272; Richardson, 843 P.2d at 522 (Bench, P.J., concurring).
If an appellant asserts that the trial court has incorrectly identified the legal
guidelines establishing its permissible field of inquiry, we use the correctionof-error standard because the appellant has challenged the "legal content" of
the trial court's finding. It~ on the other hand, an appellant cannot show that
the trial court's ultimate finding was erroneous as a matter of law, the
appellant is requesting nothing more than a second opinion on a debatable
question of fact. In such cases, an appellant is simply challenging the trial
court's judgment in its ultimate factual finding. Absent a violation of legal
guidelines, a trial court's finding of ultimate fact remains on the same level as
any other underlying factual finding, and we defer.
23

Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780; Gania v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah
1982) (same). The State must prove that Cook had an "'existing' or 'present bodily restraint,
directing influence, domination or regulation"' over a vehicle. See, Vialpando at
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citing

Bugger at 442.
The trial court opined herein that, in a crisis, an adult would take control over the
vehicle so that they did not wreck and no hann came upon themselves or their children.
R158. The court believed that, by Cook's own admission as to her actions taken to protect
J.C., that she admitted she had control of the vehicle. Id. The trial court thus found three (3)
different ways that it believed Cook had "actual physical control" of the four-wheeler: Cook
was driving and maneuvered the handlebars; Cook gave commands to a person in control;
and, under theorizing the accomplice liability statute, if Cook was participating by placing her
hands on her daughter's shoulders to guide her how to steer it, then she was controlling the
vehicle. The court then mistakenly found that J.C. testified that Cook took control the fourwheeler to get it started; however, the testimony was that Himmel had done so. R159.
During trial, Burton testified that he observed Cook driving towards him on a fourwheeler on January 3, 2015. R098. The four-wheeler slid to a stop when Burton stopped his
vehicle. Id. He observed that the four-wheeler contained three (3) passengers; J.C. was in
the front, Cook in the middle and Himmel on the back. Id. Burton observed Cook's hands
on the handlebars of the four-wheeler as it came to a stop. R099. Burton never observed
J.C. operating the four-wheeler at all. R109. Cook informed Burton that J.C. had been the
one driving the four-wheeler. Id. Burton never questioned J.C. or Himmel as to who had
been driving the four-wheeler. R120.
24

Cook never operated the four-wheeler, the accelerator, the brakes, the clutch, nor
steered the four-wheeler. Id. Cook was concerned with J.C.'s safety when the four-wheeler
slid to a stop. R131. In order to protect J.C. from harm, Cook placed her hands in the
middle of the handlebars directly in front of J.C. Id. Cook testified that the only time she
placed her hands on the handlebars was when she was protecting J.C. Id.
J.C. testified that she was operating the four-wheeler when they stopped for the
officer. R136. Himmel started the four-wheeler for J.C. R137-8. J.C. used the accelerator.
R139. J.C. did not recall Cook ever operating the four-wheeler. Id. Himmel testified that he
was a passenger on the four-wheeler and that he used the foot brake to help stop the fourwheeler. Rt 47.
Cook was riding as a passenger on a vehicle operated by her daughter, J.C. See, UTAH
CODE ANN. 41-22-2(1 l)(b). J.C. was in actual physical control of the vehicle according to

testimony provided by Cook, Himmel and J.C. herself that she was directing influence,
domination or regulation over the vehicle. UTAH CODE ANN. 41-22-2(15); Vialpando at ,I 21.
The totality of the factual circumstances, together \vi.th the application of the law on the
matter, dictated that J.C. was the sole person in actual physical control of the vehicle herein.

Id. at ii 22, dting State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442,478 (1971).
The court imputed actual physical control to Cook, who was a passenger on the
vehicle due to a perceived agent/principal relationship. In other words, Cook was the
operator's Q.C.'s) mother and the operator was a minor. Benson at 868. Specifically, the court
discounted Cook's claim that she was protecting J.C. when he placed her hands on the
steering wheel, but not seeking to operate the vehicle. The court found that, as a mother, she
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was more likely taking control back to avoid a "crisis." However, the "crisis" was simply
skidding to a stop on the snowy road when Burton motioned for them to do so. Himmel
was the one who applied the brake to the vehicle. Burton's only testimony was that Cook's
hands were on the steering wheel as he observed the vehicle slide and then come to a stop.
In Sanchez and the line of cases cited therein, numerous courts have found actual physical
control by a passenger when two facts are present: grabbing the steering wheel and causing
the vehicle to move from its normal path. Ibid. at 611-612; Rivera, 207 Ariz. at 74, 83 P.3d 69;

F.H., 192 Ca.App.4th at 1472, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 43; Yamat, 475 Mich. at 57-58, 714 N.W.2d
335; Crombleholme, 8 A.D.3d at 1070, 778 N.Y.S.2d 256; Be,;g, 394 N.W.2d at 691; Wallace, 166
Ohio App.3d at 849, 853 N.E.2d 704; Moe, 133 Or.App. at 79, 889 P.2d 1334; Hoover, 161
Pa.Cmwlth. at 522, 637 A.2d 721; Dugger, 40 Va.App. at 594, 580 S.E.2d 477; Arambul 37
Wash.App. at 808, 683 P.2d 1123. While Cook contested that she maneuvered the steering
wheel and had only placed her hands on them as they stopped to protect J.C., the district
court clearly did not credit this in its theory that a mother would take back control in those
situations. However, what was observed by and testified to by the officer was only that
"Elizabeth Cook had her hand on the handlebars when I made initial contact ... " R099. The
vehicle was already stopped at the time he claims to have observed her in this position.
There was no testimony from Burton that he saw Cook grab the steering wheel or that he
saw her cause the vehicle to move from its normal path-factors required to find that she
took actual physical control from J.C. All Burton observed was that she had a hand on the
handlebars when at a standstill. This is insufficient to find actual physical control for
purposes of the DUI statute.
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Even under Utah's statutory scheme which allows an attempted control to be
sufficient to rise to "actual physical control" (i.e. in possession of keys whether the individual
is located in or outside the vehicle), where there is a designated "operator" of the vehicle,
another cannot take control without there being actual physical actions towards doing so.
The line of cases in Sanchez support the concept that some physical control has to occur,
which is in line with Utah's statutory scheme. For instance, if a passenger took the keys from
the intoxicated individual, they would be taking their "actual physical control" element away;
however, it required a physical action to deprive them of such. Herein, Cook was required to
have not only grabbed the whee~ but also moved the vehicle from the operator's Q.C.)
chosen path..All Burton observed was Cook's hand on the steering wheel while the vehicle
was at a rest. This was not sufficient evidence to find that Cook was the operator, nor was it
sufficient to conclude that a transfer of actual physical control from J.C. to Cook had
occurred.
The district court's analysis of the totality of the circumstances did not end there,
however. It also found that Cook was exhibiting actual physical control because she was
directing J.C. verbally, and also placing her hands on her shoulders to guide her in which way
she should go if she needed it. There was no evidence presented that J.C.'s agency was
overborne by Cook in these actions as operator of the vehicle. As a passenger, Cook had the
right to give her child directions, just as the spouse in uuck. See, Benson at 868, citing uuck at
855. Also as a passenger, Cook maintained a duty in that capacity to warn J.C. of an
impending danger if J.C. was unaware of its presence. Id. However, the court erroneously
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found these rights and duties to be indicators of a transfer of actual physical control for
purposes of DUL
Burton did not testify, nor was any evidence presented, that Cook had any control
over the speed the vehicle was traveling, the starting or stopping of the vehicle, or any other
element contributing to the vehicle's movement. Benson at 868, dting Shannon, 291 Ala. at
163, 279 So.2d at 432. No evidence was presented, but it was required to show that Cook's
directions or guidance made both J.C. and Cook in joint or common control of the vehicle.

Id., tiling Bryant, 174 Cal. 737, 164 P. 385. Cook's mere directions to J.C. did not amount to
control over the vehicle equal to that J.C. which was exercising. Benson at 869. J.C. was in
control of how the vehicle was operated, regardless of any directions from Cook. To find
otherwise would cause a precedent rendering intoxicated individuals guilty of DUI for taking
a taxi cab and providing directions to the driver. Id. at 868-869, dting Churchi/4 225 Iowa at
1190, 282 N.W. at 282 (quoting Cram, 185 Iowa 1292, 172 N.W. 23). Cook's mere giving of
directions to J.C. does not establish that Cook had control over the vehicle. 8 Am.Jur.2d
Automobiles§ 706.
The ultimate factual finding, as well as the legal conclusion, that Cook was in actual
physical control of the vehicle was in violation of the legal guidelines and should be
corrected by this Court. R.ochcll, 850 P.2d at 485, dting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271-72. None of
the evidence supports a finding that Cook either exercised actual physical control of the
vehicle, nor that it was transferred to her from J.C. by any means. The court did not operate
properly ,vithin its field of inquiry by theorizing and applying accomplice liability to its
determination. No accomplice liability charge had been raised, nor was it applicable to this
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case. In order for Cook to be an accomplice in aiding J.C., it required J.C. to be committing a
crime, which is just a preposterous proposition. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473; citing Richardson, 843
P.2d at 521-22.
This Court should correct such legal error by applying the appropriate field of inquiry
to the detennination-that of actual physical control as applied to passengers respecting
DUL See, Th11r111a11 at 1271-1272; Richardson, 843 P.2d at 522. The "legal content" of the
findings and conclusions are flawed, and the district court's ultimately detennination in this
matter was subsequently erroneous as a matter of law. LopeZJ 720 P.2d at 780; Garcia, 645
P.2d at 653. 1bis Court should thus reverse the Judgment.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE OFFICER HAD PROPERLY CONDUCTED THE BAKER
TEST GIVEN THAT NO INFORMATION AS TO SYNCRONIZATION
OF DIFFERING TIMING DEVICES WAS PRESENTED TO ENSURE
THE MANDATED 15 MINUTE TIME FRAME HAD BEEN
UNDERTAKEN.
1bis Court can exclude relevant evidence when "its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice." UT. R. EVID. 403.

"A trial court's

determination that there was a proper foundation for the admission of evidence ... [is
reviewed for] an abuse of discretion.

This means that we will reverse the trial court's

decision to admit evidence only if the ruling is beyond the limits of reasonability." State v.
Woodward, 2014 UT App 162,i] 14, 330 P.3d 1283; citing State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ,I

17,256 P.3d 1102 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In detennining whether evidence is admissible, UT. R. EVID. 104(b) states that,
"[w]hen the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist." UT. R. EVID. 401 states
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that, "[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action."
"Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible; irrelevant evidence is not" State v. Ashlry,
2015 UT App 169,

,r 24, 357 P.3d 554; dting State v.

Richardson, 2013 UT 50,

,r 24, 308 P.3d

526.
In order for Cook's BAC results to be admissible, "the State must present evidence,
inter alia, that: (1) the intoxilyzcr machine had been properly checked by a trained technician,
and that the machine was in proper working condition at the time of the test; (2) the test was
administered correctly by a qualified operator; and (3) a police officer observed the
defendant during the fifteen minutes immediately preceding the test to ensure that the
defendant introduced nothing into his or her mouth during that time." State v. Vialpando,
2004 UT App 95,

,r

14, 89 P.3d 209; See In re Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Utah

1977) (Maughan, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806, 809-10
(1960) (articulating foundation elements for intoxilyzer tests)); see also Salt Lake City v.
Womat~, 747 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1987) (affirming the necessity of the pre-test

observation period).
"The burden of demonstrating the admissibility of the proffered evidence is on the
prosecution. The prosecution must lay a foundation upon which the trial court can make
any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach any necessary legal conclusions. S fate v.
RamireZi 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991), tiling State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah

1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988); State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 451 (Utah
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1987). The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property, ,vithout due process of law." State v. GuZ!'lan, 2006
UT 12, ,r 14, 133 P.3d 363 (Utah 2006).
Rule 901 requires that the proponent of an item of evidence authenticate or identify it
with "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it
is." State v. Woodward, 2014 UT App 162, ,r 16, 330 P.3d 1283; quoting UTAH R. EVID. 901(a).
''Proper authentication does not require conclusive proof but, instead, requires only that the
trial court determine that there is 'evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment
of [a] condition' of fact." Id at ,r 17, dting State v. CD.L, 2011 UT App 55, ,r 24, 250 P.3d
69 (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 104(b) (2011)) (alteration in original).
In the instant matter, Burton testified that he had previous training on how to
operate the Intoxilyzer. R106. Burton testified that the Intoxilyzer had been calibrated by a
technician before and after Cook's BAC was given. Id The State submitted as evidence the
calibration certificates for the Intoxilyzer. Id Burton testified during trial that he observed

Baker on Cook at 14:34. R109. The BAC was then administered at 14:51. Rl 10. Burton
testified that he "probably used his cell phone" to note the time of Baker but could not recall
if that is what he had done. Burton pulled the time the BAC was administered off of the
Intoxilyzer print-out. Id
Burns objected to the admission of Cook's BAC test results based upon the
testimony that two (2) separate time pieces were used and no testimony was offered as to
whether the two (2) separate time pieces were at all synchronized. Rl 12. Burns also argued
as part of his objection, that no testimony had been offered in regards to the specific amount
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of time that elapsed between the time recorded and the time of Baker. Id.

Burns argued

that the Baker standard fifteen (15) minute time requirement was a strict compliance
admissibility issue that was part of the foundational requirements for the BAC test results to
be offered and submitted as evidence. R113. The trial court stated that evidence was
offered to show that the fifteen (15) minute requirement had been met. R115. Specifically,
the trial court stated that the fifteen (15) minute requirement had been met because of two
(2) electronic devices that gave a two (2) minute cushion. Id.
Further on voir dire, Burton stated that he did not use his cell phone to time the
fifteen (15) minutes when he observed Baker.

Id.

Burton explained that the officer

physically entered the time taken from another device into the Intoxilyzer. Id.

The

Intoxilyzer then counted down the fifteen (15) minutes from the time stamp that was
entered. Burton assumed that the Intoxilyzer had its own time set but did not know for
sure. R118. Burton stated that he was unsure where the Intoxilyzer pulled its time from
because the Intoxilyzer was not plugged into an outside source such as the internet or a
telephone line. Id.

At the conclusion of trial, Burns declined to brief the issues of

synchronization any further. R160.
This Court can review the trial court's ruling that the State had meet its burden in
laying the "proper foundational" requirements of Baker in order for Cook's BAC to be
admissible evidence as an "abuse of discretion." See, Woodward at ,I 14 dting Burke at ,I 17.
Cook's argument herein is that the State failed to adequately lay the proper
foundational requirements on Baker in order for her BAC test results to be proffered as
admissible evidence. See, Ramimz at 778, tiling Carter at 890; Bishop at 463 and Wright at 451.
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In order for Cook's BAC to be admissible, the State needed to have presented evidence
towards the three (3) foundational requirements set forth as part of the elements of Baker.
Burton testified that the lntoxilyzer had been calibrated by a trained technician and that he
[Burton] had been trained on how to properly operate the lntoxilyzer.
calibration certificates were submitted by the State as evidence. Id.

R106.

The

The State fulfilled the

first two (2) requirements for Baker; however, they failed to properly meet the third
requirement of the fifteen (15) minute observation period through Burton's testimony. See,

Vialpando at ,r 14, dting Oaks at 1367, Baker at 809-10 and Salt Lake City at 1041.
Burton first testified that he "probably had used his cell phone to note Baker." R110.
Upon further questioning as to the timing issues, Burton testified that he "did not use his
cell phone to time Baker." Id. Burton testified that the Intoxilyzer would count down the
fifteen (15) minutes, after he manually entered in the time into the Intoxilyzer. R115. Now,
based upon Burton's testimony, he could not recall where he pulled the time from.

The

information presented through Burton's testimony was very non-spe<;ific as to whether Baker
ran from the time observed on the "unknown timing device" or the time it was entered on
the Intoxilyzer. The facts presented confused the timing issue and were not clear and concise
in order for the State to "lay a foundation" that would have allowed the trial court to have
"reached legal conclusions" to accept Cook's BAC as admissible evidence. See, Ramirez at
778, dting Carter at 890, Bishop at 463 and Wright at 451. Cook's Due Process right was
violated without the necessary evidence proving that the two (2) differing timing devices
utilized in observing Baker was sufficiently reliable in order to be admitted into evidence.

See, Guzman at ,r 14; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Utah Const. Art. I§§ 7 and 12.
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The time Baker was observed by Burton was recorded by him at 14:34. R109. It is
unclear if Burton then typed 14:34 into the lntoxilyzer and that machine counted to 14:49 on
its own internal clock or, instead, if the lntoxilyzer counted 15 minutes from a beginning and
end point both on its own internal clock from the time Burton input information. Cook's
BAC was administered at 14:51 by the Intoxilyzer clock, according to the Intoxilyzer printout sheet. R110. Further, the State failed to provide evidence identifying of the "unknown
timing device" or any synchronization. Without these specifics, Burton could not lay
sufficient foundation to fulfill the final requirement to deem Cook's BAC admissible under

Baker. See, Vialpando at ,I 14, tiling Oaks at 1367, Baker at 809-10 and Womack at 1041. The
Court's finding and conclusion that the 2 minute "cushion" rendered the Baker requirement
met was arbitrary since two clocks can be more than 2 minutes off from one another,
particularly where evidence indicates that the Intoxilyzer is not on a standard time since it is
not connected to the internet or another device from which it obtains its clock.
Cook's BAC should have been excluded as irrelevant evidence because it unfairly
prejudiced her by lacking sufficient foundational support. UT. R. EVID. 403. The State bore
the burden of establishing that the two timing devices were authenticated and synchronized.
UT.

R. EVID. 401 and 901; see, Woodward at ,I 16. The State did not present any testimony or

evidence that would authenticate the synchronization of the two (2) timing devices in order
to support a finding as to the fulfillment of the Baker three (3) step requirements for the
admittance of Cook's BAC test results.

See, CD.L at ,I 24. There was absolutely no

authentication made.
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The State's presentation of Cook's BAC results should have been excluded as lacking
foundational support, and therefore nonadmissible and irrelevant to the proceedings. See,

Ashby at ,I 24 quoting FJchardson at ,I 24. This Court should thus reverse the Judgment
accordingly and, if found to be necessary, remand with direction to exclude such results
from determination on the charges herein.

III.

BURNS RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILING TO FOLLOW-THROUGH WITH THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS THAT WAS FILED WITH REGARD TO UNREASONABLE
DETAINMENT FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES.
This Court and our Utah Supreme Court have previously stated that two (2)

conditions should be met before they

"\Vill

consider the merits of a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal. In State v. HJ11JJjJhries, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that "ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on appeal if [1] the trial record is
adequate to pennit decision of the issue and [2] defendant is represented by counsel other
than trial counsel." Stale v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,I 9, 12 P.3d 92, dting State v.

Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah
1996). "On appeal, it is the defendant's obligation to provide supporting arguments by
citation to the record." Id at ,I 11. The U.S CONST. .A.MEND. VI provides for the following:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
In State v. Curry, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "the Sixth Amendment, the Utah
Constitution, and state statutory law ... guarantee an accused the right to be represented by
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counsel." Ibid, 2006 UT App 390, ,I 6, 147 P.3d 483, citing State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776,
779 (Utah App.1996); see also U.S. CONST. AMEND VI; UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 12; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-1-6(1)(a) (2003). "[T]he Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." M1,Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90
S.Ct. 144, 125 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).
A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is discussed in State v. Houston as
follows:
The right to counsel under the Sixth ..Amendment to the United States
Constitution includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
In Strickland v. 1¥7ashington, the United States Supreme Court announced the
two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the defendant
must show that ''his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." Second, the defendant must demonstrate
"that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Ibid., 2015 UT 40 ,110, 353 P.3d 55; citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

2052. Utah has adopted the Strickland test and indicated "[t]o show ineffective assistance of
counsel ... , a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome ... would have been
different." State v. Gailry, 2015 UT App 249 ,I14, --- P.3d ----, quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d
236,243 (Utah 1995).
A Motion to Suppress evidence shall contain the following:
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; (2) set forth the standing of
the movant to make the application; and (3) specify the sufficient legal and
factual grounds for the motion to give the opposing party reasonable notice of
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the issues and to enable the court to determine what proceedings are
appropriate to address them.
UT. R. CRIM. P. 12(d). The Utah Court of Appeals in Curry went on to further state that

"[u]nder both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, [Defendant] had
the right to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding." Ibid,

2006 UT .App 390, ,I 6, 147 P.3d 483, citing Wagstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah
.App.1990). ''The accused's right to the assistance of counsel during the critical stages of a
criminal proceeding has long been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right."

Wagstaff.

In the instant matter, Burns filed a Motion with the trial court on July 16, 2015.
R060. The Motion specifically requested the suppression of test results conducted.

Id.

During trial, after Burns questioned Burton on voir dire, he raised an objection. Rl 11. The
objection raised was in regards to the B.AC results being offered and submitted as evidence.

Id. Burns argued that Baker is a foundational admissibility requirement in order for BAC
results to be offered as evidence. Rl 13. The State argued that Burns should have raised the
admissibility issue prior to trial. Id. The trial court responded to the arguments made by
counsel stating that Burns had in fact filed a Motion. Id. Burns' Motion was vague and did
not contain details. Id. Burns admitted that "obviously he did not follow through with the
Motion." Rl 14. Burns expressed to the trial court that during a suppression hearing, he
would have addressed the aforementioned Baker issues. Id.
The record is adequate for this Court's review, as set forth more particularly supra at
.Argument IL Cook's arguments are supported by citations to the record. Id. at ,I 11. Thus
this Court can evaluate Cook's ineffective assistance of counsel claim given that she is
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represented by new counsel for her appeal herein. See, Litherland at ,I 9, and Humphries at
1029.
Cook maintained the right to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST.
AMEND. VI; Curry at ,I 6, McDonald at 779; and UTAH CONST. ART I §12; McMann at 771;

Houston at ,I 70. However, Burns' failure to follow-through with the Motion did not protect
Cook's constitutional rights. Burns' failure fell below the objective standard of
reasonableness. Id.

This failure greatly prejudiced Cook because she went to trial without

her Motion regarding the suppression of the BAC results. Id. Had Burns actually followedthrough and argued the Motion, there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of Cook's
case could have been drastically different. See, Gailey at ,I 14 and Smith at 243.
The Motion that Burns filed requested the suppression of evidence and set forth the
standing that such Motion was applicable by the moving party.

Specifically as Burns

indicated, the Motion requested the suppression of Cook's BAC test results. R060. While
Burns correctly followed the first two (2) requirements for this Motion, he neglected to
articulate legal and factual grounds that gave weight and support to the evidence he was
seeking be suppressed. See, UT. R. CRIM. P. 12(d). By articulating legal and factual grounds,
it would have made the trial court aware that a suppression hearing on the Motion was in
order. The trial court even stated that the Motion was "vague" and did not "provide details
of what it contained." R113. Burns admitted during trial that he did not "follow-through
with the Motion." R114. Burns performance in providing the trial court with a proper
Motion containing relevant legal authority and a factual basis for the suppression of said
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evidence fell below the reasonable standard of professional judgment and such perfoanance
prejudiced Cook and her case. See, Gailf!J at,r 14 and Smith at 243.
Cook had a c'right to effective assistance of counsel" during all "critical stages of her
criminal proceedings.'' See, Cuny at ,I 6 and Wag.daft at 778. The cceffective assistance of

counsel" during "critical stages" [was] a constitutional right Id. The Motion filed by Bums
was very "critical" to Cook. During trial, Bums objected to the admission of the BAC test

results based upon the Jack of foundational requirements set forth in Bak.er fo~:the ~sion
of such evidence. Rt 13. B~s even expressed to the trial court that during a s~ppression
hearing, he would have ccaddressed any issues with Baker." Rt 14. At trial, Bums only briefly
argued his objection in regards to the Baker issues. A suppression hearing would have given
Bums the time he needed to properly address the Motion, provide a well thought-out
argument as to the merits of the Motion, and argue in-depth as to the issues the Motion
raised At an evidentiaty hearing, Bums would have had a chance to thoroughly question
Button as to the admissibility of the BAC test results. Had this Motion been heard prior to
trial, Cook's case could have been impacted drastically. Failure to follow-through with the

Motion and request a suppression hearing on the Motion deprived Cook of the
constitutional right to ''effective assistance of counsel" U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI and UTAH
CONST. ART I §12. This Court should thus reverse the Judgment and, if necessary, remand
for correction of such violations.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Cook respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Judgment based on the clearly erroneous findings of "actual physical control"
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and the error as a matter of law in concluding Cook was guilty of DUI. Altematlvely, should
this Court af£inn that issue, Cook requests that this Court reverse the Judgment and remand
the matter for correction of the violation of her constitutional rights on the basis that., due to
ineffectiveness of counsel, inadmissible evidence was admitted below with a lack of
foundation that had a prejudicial impact on the outcome of the case.

DAlED this 18th day of March, 2016.
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Addendum ,_,A,_,
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, dated October 6, 2015.

FILED

IN THE FIFIB DISTRICT COURT FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OCT -6 2015

40 Nonh 100 East, Cedar City, Utah 84nO
43S-867-32S0

STATE OF UTAH,

DEPUTY C

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE

COURT
IRON COUNTY

Jil-----

PROBATION ORDER

vs.

(Revised 09/1 S)

CriminalNo. /5€5DDODL(
Judge Keith Barnes

Defendant.
JUDGMENT

The Defendant has been convicted of the following cr~inal offense(s):

06l1i"'1 tJ'#fcH.e :Io"tfw«e oi:: ,4 b,ha {

• a class
Count 2: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. a class

Count I:

_.i misdemeanor.
misdemeanor.

Count 3:

a class

misdemeanor.

Count 4:

a class

misdemeanor.

SENTENCE
On this judgment, the sentence of the Court is as follows:

ZS-bl> .

Count 1: 31,l{
days incarceration; $
~o fine;
Count 2: _ _ _ _days incarceration; $_ _ _ _ _fine;
Count 3: _ _ _ _days incarceration; $_ _ _ _ _fine;
Count 4: _ _ _ _days incarceration; $_ _ _ _ _fine;

plus 90% surcharge & $43
plus 90% surcharge & $43
plus 90% surcharge & $43
plus 90% surcharge & $43

court security fee
court security fee
court security fee
court security fee

Credit is given for _ _ _ _ days incarceration already served.
Multiple jail sentences shall be served ( ) concurrently ( )consecutively.

ORDER OF PROBATION
Execution of the sentence is stayed. You, the Defendant, will have

J

2L/

Priu,fe fl-ol:vJ>;,

months of probation and you

will be ( ) responsible to the Court ~ supervised by
on these conditions:
Sign up for private probation within 48 hours. To be privately supervised for at least 6 months and may
receive up to $240 credit to fine ifno violations.

__j.. Obey all laws and commit no further law viol ·ons.
___1:.. Serve Z
da~ injail, with credit for_-+---+days served; report to the Iron County Jail

d-

( ) immediately (0 by
a . ~ on-----~--..........'--+-----' \.,,rfo serve straight time
( ) to serve _ _ hours and then report on each _ _ _ _ thereafter to serve
hours until the
sentence has been served, and obey all jail rules and policies while incarcerated.

1COO , including the 90% surcharge, and the court secufty fee of$$- to the
~rt,)° payments of at least $ $l) per month, on the day of each month,
beginning }2 j_l ~ l~
.;jJlus interest at the legal rate.

_____$Paya fine of$
Clerk of the

_ _ Pay$_ _ _ _ _ to the Clerk of Court for victim restitution, in payments of at least $_ _ _ _ per
month, on the first business day of each month, beginning _ _ _ _ __

~ Reimburse Iron County $/OD· oo for the services of your court appointed attorney. Payments received
will be first credited to your obligation to pay victim restitution, then to reimburse Iron County for the
services of your court appointed attorney and then to pay your fines and fees.
Complete _ _ _ hours of community service, at no fewer than _ _ _ hours per month. File monthly
written reports of hours completed; your first report is due _ _ _ _ _ . ( ) Sign up with the Volunteer
Center within _ _ hours and pay the required fee.

J

~

Obtain a written evaluation for ( ) mental health ¢() alcohol/drug abuse ( ) domestic violence ( ) anger
management from a ~-approved professional counselor/therapist and file the evaluation with the Court on or
before Ott,,.,l.tc \) . en complete all recommended counseling, treatment and therapy at your own expense,
and file proof of completion. The cost of the evaluation and treatment, if recommended, will be credited toward
your fine, to a maximum of$___ once you provide proof of payment and successful completion of treatment·
Sign up for a life skills course within 48 hours, and complete it within 60 days. If complete within 30 days, the
cost will be credited against your fine.
Do not possess, distribute or use any illegal drugs or synthetic versions thereof, do not associate with persons
who do so, and do not go to or remain at any location where such drugs are present.
___:f.c Do not possess or consume any alcoholic beverages, including medications and energy drinks that contain
alcohol, and do not go to any private location where alcohol is being served or any business where alcohol is the
main item on the menu (such as a bar) and do not go to any location where alcohol is the chief item of sale (such
as a liquor store).
___$,. Sign a consent to release treatment information form for all providers of mental or physical health care so that the
Iron County Attorney and any person supervising your probation has access to your mental and medical health
care records and may discuss you and your treatment with your mental or medical health care providers.
~ Submit to warrantless searches of your person and property, and/or to testing of breath and/or bodily fluids, upon
request of any probation officer, if your probation is being supervised by someone other than the court, or any
law enforcement officer or anyone involved in providing any treatment ordered as a condition of probation.
Write a letter of apology to the victim(s) and submit it to the Court and prosecutor within 30 days.
Maintain full-time employment and/or education, schooling or job training.
Have no contact or communication with _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Attend the first review hearing with Judge Barnes on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at 9:00 am, and attend all other
review hearings as ordered.
~ Keep the Court advised of your current address at all times and notify the Court of any change of address within
48 hours of the change.
__:::t.. Submit a DNA sample to the State Department of Corrections and pay the fee.
Exonerate bond. ___ Refund cash bail to payor.
_ _ Other terms of probation: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

IF YOU FAIL TO MEET ANY OF THE ABOVE CONDITIONS, THE COURT MAY ISSUE A
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST AND MAY REVOKE YOUR PROBATION.

Defense counsel's withdrawal is granted. ~
Dated

16(~(,~

_
JUDGE KEITH C. BARNES
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